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Abstract: In this article I set out to explore the Tajik-Afghan frontier in Tajikistan’s
Gorno-Badakhshan region as a “contact zone” in which different actors engage in
communicative encounters. Against this backdrop I take the construction of bridges
across the Tajik-Afghan border river as a point of departure to analyse how these
actors envisage processes of globalization. Following Pennycook, I argue that a
focus on language as local practice reveals that the Tajik-Afghan frontier is marked
by a high degree of different languages, but also by multiple meanings within and
beyond these languages. As a result I maintain that highlighting the locality of
languages at the Tajik-Afghan frontier provides an opportunity to frame language
as tied to specific communicative encounters in semiotized time and space.
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1 Introduction
On a cold Sunday morning in November 2002 three men gather on the northern
bank of the Panj, the river that marks the Tajik-Afghan border. They walk over a
newly constructed bridge, cut ribbons, step up onto a stage, and then address a
large crowd of people listening on both sides of the river. In their speeches in
Tajik, Dari, and English (which are informally translated and paraphrased into
Pamir languages),1 the three men refer to the bridge as crucial for re-establishing
ties between Tajikistan and Afghanistan after the isolation of Soviet rule, for
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1 Tajik and Dari are both south-western Iranian languages and are mutually intelligible. The
Pamir languages are of south-eastern Iranian origin and not comprehensible to a Tajik or Dari
speaker without prior experience or language training. However, there is also great diversity
within the Pamir languages, which include Bartangi, Ishkoshimi, Khufi, Roshorvi, Rushoni,
Sariqoli, Shughni, Wakhi, and Yazghulomi. Not all Pamir languages are mutually intelligible
(see Dodykhudoeva 2002; Bahry 2016).
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economic development in the region, and for renewed interaction between dis-
connected communities on each shore of the river (AKDN 2002; Tasneem 2002).
The three men inaugurating the Tem-Demogan bridge in Tajikistan’s Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) were the Tajik president Emomali
Rahmon, the then vice-president of Afghanistan Hedayat Amin Arsala, and the
current Imam of the Nizari-Ismaili Muslims, Prince Shah Karim Al Hussaini Aga
Khan IV.2 Since 2002, they themselves and their envoys or successors have
opened a series of new bridges across the river Panj, one of the main tributaries
of the famous Amu Darya, or Oxus, as Western historiographers have called it
until very recently (Curzon 2005 [1896]; Toynbee 1961). See Figure 1.
2 Throughout the article I use pseudonyms for my interlocutors and only state the actual names
of well-known public figures.
Figure 1: The border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan along the river Panj.
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In the course of this ongoing attempt to reconnect Tajikistan and
Afghanistan, which had been separated by Soviet boundary-making and enfor-
cement measures along the river for most of the twentieth century, the construc-
tion of the bridges constitutes the most visible, material aspect of the endeavour.
However, the process of planning, building, opening, and living with these
bridges has also involved encounters between diverse actors bringing with
them varying ideologies expressed in different languages. Questioning the
image of globalization as a smooth “flow of goods, ideas, money, and people”,
Tsing (2005: 5) sees such encounters as marked by “friction”, which she defines
as “awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection
across difference” (Tsing 2005: 4). Following Tsing, in this article I seek to
analyse the communicative encounters that the construction of bridges between
Tajikistan and Afghanistan has triggered. In this respect I build on existing
social science research on borderlands in different parts of the world (e.g.,
Baud and Van Schendel 1997; Omoniyi 2004; Evans 2010; Van Schendel and
De Maaker 2014), and in the former Soviet Union in particular (e.g., Muth 2014a;
2014b; Reeves 2014). Inspired by the work of Pennycook (2010: 133) I also
explore the question of how specific linguistic resources “are drawn on for
different effects”, by whom and under which circumstances. To do so, I build
on multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork (Marcus 1995) conducted in Tajikistan
between 2008 and 2013, including recorded interviews, as well as on data
from public discourse and NGO reports.
In order to prepare the ground for the analysis of my data I first introduce the
conceptual framework of this article. Then I focus on the public discourse surround-
ing the construction of the bridges and present examples, based on my ethno-
graphic fieldwork, of lives in the region that are variously affected by and entangled
with the history of bridge construction. Finally I attempt to go beyond the construc-
tion of bridges along the Panj to explore the meaning of “language as a local
practice” (Pennycook 2010) at the Tajik-Afghan frontier from a broader perspective.
2 Approaching the frontier
Tsing’s (2005) notion of “friction” is closely linked to a polysemic understanding
of communicative encounters. Accordingly, interventions such as the construc-
tion of bridges across the river Panj in Tajikistan are not essentially and a priori
endeavours of economic, ideological, or geostrategic significance. While they
reconfigure ongoing social and political processes, such interventions also draw
upon and are (continuously being) reworked in specific locales. In order to
emphasize the communicative nature of these encounters, I conceptualize
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such locales as “contact zones” in which, following Clifford (1997: 7), “the
making and remaking of identities” takes place “along […] policed and trans-
gressive intercultural frontiers”.
Clifford (1997) bases his definition of “contact zone” on the work of Pratt
(2008 [1992]: 8), who borrows the term from research on contact languages and
employs it as a substitute for the value-laden category “colonial frontier”. Pratt
argues that such “frontiers” are always constituted with respect to Europe (or
other centres of power) and thus are already the outcome of historically produced
asymmetries. She maintains that we should instead look at interactions within
such zones as shifting “the center of gravity and the point of view”. Pratt (Pratt
2008 (1992): 8) sees the benefit of looking at a “contact zone” in the fact that “it
invokes the space and time where subjects previously separated by geography and
history are co-present, the point at which their trajectories now intersect”.
The construction of bridges across the river Panj is a tangible example of
such a point of intersection and allows for exploration in different directions. In
this regard, bridge construction is salient not just due to its vivid materiality, but
also because it evokes communication on various scales in “semiotized space
and time” (Blommaert et al. 2014: 3; see also; Blommaert 2007). In the course of
these communicative encounters different actors address different audiences in
different languages, enacting a multi-layered set of identities often with refer-
ence to specific ideologies and with unknown outcomes. As a result the local
undergoes transformations that include not simply a change of context, but a
relocalization in the sense of a reassembling of the known. Within this frame-
work, and following Pennycook (2010: 4−5), language needs to be conceptua-
lized as local practice that is not only related to place, but “must always be
understood in terms of its embeddedness in locality”. Thus, language as local
practice furthermore refers “to the ways in which any understanding of the
locality of language must also encompass an appreciation of the locality of
perspective, of the different ways in which language, locality and practice are
conceived in different contexts”.
Taking Pennycook’s point seriously means acknowledging that we cannot
look for a pre-defined set of languages which coincidentally meet at the opening
of bridges between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Rather, we should focus on how
these languages are constantly under construction, how they purport different
ideologies, and how they coincide, intersect, and drift apart. As a consequence,
Tajik is not simply Tajik, English not simply English, Russian not simply
Russian, and “local” languages perhaps less local than we think. From such a
perspective there are always different projects of English, Kyrgyz, Russian,
Shughni, Tajik, and so forth in the making, depending on who speaks to
whom, when, and in what “contact zone”.
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In the following I build on this point by organizing my data according to
specific, interrelated communicative encounters. In this regard it is clear that I
can only present brief extracts from such encounters that I perceive as central to
the understanding of broader processes of the co-construction of language in the
localities under analysis. I furthermore restrict my analysis to communicative
encounters that occurred on the Tajik side of the border region, in Tajikistan’s
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO). Localities in south-western
Tajikistan as well as on the Afghan side of the border are not within the scope
of this analysis.
3 Let the construction begin
Looking at the Tajik-Afghan frontier in Gorno-Badakhshan as a “contact zone”
also means including moments of disconnection and the reorganization of
contact on different scales. Going back in history, wars, conflict, and imperial
boundary-making were at the heart of these transformation processes. While
certainly not the beginning of these dynamics, the latter part of the nineteenth
century is a potential point of departure for understanding why today’s actors
invoke the historical references they do when talking about regional changes
and the reorganization of space. In this regard, it is important to note that the
Tajik-Afghan frontier in Gorno-Badakhshan used to be part of a colonial border
region that was created on the basis of wars and treaties between the Russian
Empire, the British Empire, and Afghanistan in the course of the late nineteenth
century (Barfield 2010: 146–154; Saikal 2012: 31; Straub 2013).
In the process of establishing rule in Central Asia in the 1920s, the Soviets
followed colonial boundary-making and defined the territory north of the Panj as
part of the newly founded Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic. This delimitation was
finalized in 1929 and provided the framework for an independent Tajikistan after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Bergne 2007: 131). For people living at the
Tajik-Afghan frontier, the Soviet distinction between a friendly socialist and a
hostile capitalist realm carved out by the river Panj had actual, often dramatic
consequences. In order to prevent “contact” in the form of flows of “people, goods
andmoney”, the border was kept “under lock and key” (na zamok) (Shaw 2011: 332).
Previous practices, including trade, inter-marriage, and travel across the river,
changed and were organized along points of reference within the Tajik Soviet
Socialist Republic and other places in the Soviet Union. In addition, Soviet moder-
nization programmes in various fields of society such as infrastructure, education,
and health care were designed to create a gap between the “modern” Tajik and the
“backward” Afghan sides of the Panj (Manetta 2011; Remtilla 2012: 45–55).
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The establishment of a militarized Cold War boundary in Gorno-Badakhshan
did not imply that political and economic ties between the Soviet Union and
Afghanistan were non-existent. In fact, recent research shows that the Soviet
Union was a major development partner for Afghanistan from the 1950s onwards
(Robinson and Dixon 2013; Nunan 2016). However, individual links and personal
cross-border relations were prohibited on a local level in Gorno-Badakhshan.
This situation only began to change after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in
1991 and the beginning of the Tajik civil war, which ravaged the country from
1992 to 1997 (Epkenhans 2014; see also Nourzhanov and Bleuer 2013: 323–335).
While militiamen, drug traffickers, and refugees crossed the river for different
purposes during that time, in the past fifteen years international aid and devel-
opment interventions have offered new opportunities for “contact”, including
the construction of bridges and trade terminals.
The question of language at the Tajik-Afghan frontier has been highly
politicized since the early days of Soviet rule. In order to ensure, at least pro
forma, a coherent Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic based on a majority of Tajik
speakers, Soviet planners showed little appreciation for the distinct Pamir
languages that are dominant on both banks of the Tajik-Afghan frontier
(Bergne 2007: 62). Despite the fact that Soviet ethnographers observed the
emergence of a common “Pamiri” identity among speakers of Pamir languages
as early as 1935 (Hirsch 2005: 279), Pamir languages received no official status
beyond the right of “usage” (and therefore neither a standardized script nor
recognition as a language of instruction in schools) (Straub 2014: 177). Moreover,
even though speakers of Pamir languages were officially defined as Tajiks in the
Soviet Union, many inhabitants of Gorno-Badakhshan developed a particular
affinity for Russian, which used to be the dominant language of education in the
region and was promoted by Soviet authorities through generous “Moscow
provisioning” (Moskovskoe obespechenie) in their efforts to integrate the border-
land into a larger Soviet framework (Mostowlansky 2017).
In Tajikistan, as in many parts of Central Asia and indeed the former Soviet
sphere of influence in its entirety, the later Soviet period and the eventual
dissolution of the Union brought with them changing attitudes and policies
towards the Russian language (Pavlenko 2008: 282; Kellner-Heinkele and
Landau 2012: 9–12, 173–197). In the following period, in independent Tajikistan
a centralized concept of nationhood nurtured by Tajik language and culture
emerged. During the Tajik civil war, this concept of nationhood intersected with
acts of violence that drew on regional and linguistic identities. For instance,
Epkenhans (2016: 346) notes that in the war-torn capital Dushanbe, male passen-
gers on public buses were tested by militiamen in order to identify their origin.
The passengers were forced to pronounce specific Tajik words while the
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militiamen checked for a Pamiri accent. Those men identified as coming from
Gorno-Badakhshan were arrested as members of the opposition and executed.
Similar memories are still vivid in Gorno-Badakhshan, where they have
become entangled with differing evaluations of Tajik as a language, but also
with the state as a whole. A new law on language, introduced in Tajikistan in
2009, places a strong emphasis on Tajik as the sole language of administra-
tion and has contributed to this process (Kellner-Heinkele and Landau 2012:
178; Mostowlansky 2017: 118–122; Bolander 2016). In addition, frequent unrest
and violence in Gorno-Badakhshan since 2012, particularly in its administra-
tive centre Khorog, have rekindled ambiguous attitudes towards the state and
Tajik as its “preferred” language. In the course of my fieldwork in Khorog and
in the eastern part of Gorno-Badakhshan, many of my interlocutors referred to
these civil war and post-civil war events when talking about the Tajik lan-
guage. In this regard, they often distinguished between an “artificial” (iskusst-
vennyi) Tajik that is spoken by state officials (and therefore linked to war
atrocities) and a “beautiful” (khoshroi) Tajik that can be found in poetry,
songs, and religious texts. Thus, to my interlocutors in Gorno-Badakhshan,
it mattered a great deal who spoke to them, how, and on the basis of which
common history.
4 The president comes by
Against the backdrop of Tajik civil war history, a presidential visit to Gorno-
Badakhshan is not only a political event; it also reverberates in regional, ethnic,
religious, and linguistic identities. Accordingly, the speeches that President
Emomali Rahmon gives in Gorno-Badakhshan are designed for specific audi-
ences with particular expectations and take into account the region’s multi-
layered heterogeneity. For instance, in 2010 Rahmon urgently called for national
unity in the district of Murghab, which is mostly inhabited by Kyrgyz-speaking
Sunni Muslims.3 With Kyrgyz and Tajik being mutually unintelligible, the pre-
sident found himself in the absence of a common linguistic identity. He
3 According to data from 2015 provided by the local government in Murghab, the district’s total
population of around 15,000 consisted of 12,000 Kyrgyz and 3,000 Tajiks. While the category
Kyrgyz means that these are inhabitants who speak Kyrgyz, a Turkic language of the Kipchak
branch, as their first language (Karabaev and Ahn 2016), the Tajiks in Murghab are almost
exclusively speakers of Pamir languages (predominantly Bartangi and Wakhi). Despite Tajik
being the language of administration in Murghab, Kyrgyz, Russian, and Pamir languages are in
fact much more commonly used in most spheres of life in the district.
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therefore delivered his speech in Tajik but based it on a historical narrative of
intermarriage between Kyrgyz and Tajiks (Mostowlansky 2012: 254). By referring
to common kin and religious identity (Sunni Islam), Rahmon attempted to
bridge the “friction” between him (representing the Tajik state) and his Kyrgyz
audience, most of whom could not follow the speech without informal transla-
tion. Such locally adapted encounters can also be observed with regard to other
public events, including ceremonies celebrating the opening of bridges across
the Panj. Since 2002 a number of bridges have been completed at different
points along the river stretching from western Tajikistan to the south-eastern
part of Gorno-Badakhshan, thus providing the Tajik president with opportunities
to establish contact with diverse audiences.
On 16 August 2011, President Rahmon participated in the opening of the
fourth bridge across the Panj, which cost the Aga Khan Foundation US $2.6
million. The project also includes a small German-financed cross-border market
(AKDN 2011). The bridge is located in the district of Vanj, which is part of Gorno-
Badakhshan but whose population differs from the region’s majority with regard
to first language and religious identity. While most inhabitants of Gorno-
Badakhshan speak a range of Pamir languages and are Ismaili Muslims who
identify with the Aga Khan, people in Vanj are predominantly speakers of Tajik
and Sunni Muslims (like most other Tajiks in the country). Thus, Rahmon
addressed the audience in Vanj in Tajik as follows (Example 1):
(1) Dear compatriots, respected guests and participants! I am very glad that I
have once again the opportunity to meet you – hospitable, nice, conscien-
tious, and patriotic people of the paradisal district of Vanj. Above all I
would like to tell you that every time I come here I feel happiness and
satisfaction based on your true support for the policies of the state and the
government of Tajikistan.
(Prezident 2011)4
In his speech Rahmon expressed intimacy towards his audience in Vanj based
on a form of assumed political loyalty that is ultimately rooted in ethnic Tajik
sameness. This is lexicalized through the use of the term “compatriots” (ham-
vatanon) in the salutation, the expression of gratitude for what the president
refers to as “true” (samimona) support, and the persistent use of positive
adjectives to describe the people as patriotic and the district of Vanj as
“paradisal” (bihishtoso). In this sense, the president came to say that the
Vanjis’ alignment with state policies can be taken for granted because, in
4 All translations by the author unless otherwise noted.
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this particular setting, they represent the ideal-type citizens who are “native”
in Tajik and follow Sunni Islam. However, in everyday Gorno-Badakhshan, the
Vanjis’ position is actually much more diverse than the speech would lead one
to assume: Vanjis share regional traits of Pamiri identity with the majority of
Pamiris, although, as stated above, they differ with regard to first language
and religious identity.
Differences between Vanjis and other Pamiris can become central in every-
day encounters, but they often gain particular importance in official settings in
the course of which the acknowledgment of “national unity” (vahdati millī)
stands at the forefront. Such instances not only highlight how ideal-type citizens
should behave but also how they should not. In this regard, a presidential
speech (Example 2) that Rahmon gave during a public meeting (muloqot) in
conflict-torn Khorog in September 2012 stands in contradistinction to his appear-
ance in Vanj:
(2) [T]he negative events that took place in Khorog [in July 2012] show that the
students’ education in the spirit of patriotism, loyalty towards national and
state interests, respect for the constitutional order, and observance of
existing laws is on a very low level in particular schools – especially in
the city of Khorog.
(Prezident 2012)
While mitigated via reference to the students (instead of a more direct you),
President Rahmon’s criticism comes across loud and clear and is bolstered by
pointing to loyalty, respect, and observance, all positive, desirable qualities that
are represented as lacking in this context. This short extract of Rahmon’s speech
can be read against the background of a multi-faceted conflict between militias
in Khorog (and their followers) and government forces that has lingered since
the Tajik civil war. The conflict has been played out in different realms, includ-
ing political power and regional identities (Heathershaw 2009: 20–40), religion
(Mostowlansky 2016) and, not least, linguistic differences. Thus in his speeches
President Rahmon’s focus on a larger framework of “national interests” not only
included the distinction between loyal and disloyal people and places, but also
showed little understanding for differences between a normative state ideology
(in which the Tajik language plays a central role) and divergent local identities
and practices. Going back to the example of the ceremony for the opening of the
bridge in Vanj in August 2011, this becomes clear in the way Rahmon first
asserted and emphasized the loyalty of his local audience, but then immediately
moved to an evaluation of the bridge’s advantages from an official perspective,
as perceived from Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe (Example 3):
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(3) With the construction of the mentioned objects [the bridges] and with the
repair work of Afghanistan’s northern roads, our country gains access to
the shortest transport route to important warm-water ports on the Persian
Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Our country will furthermore be able to con-
nect to important and developing world regions such as western Asia,
South Asia, and South East Asia, which is not only of great economic and
communicational importance, but also of political and geostrategic signif-
icance for the Republic of Tajikistan and the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan.
(Prezident 2011)
Apart from grand economic opportunities in a globalized Asia, Rahmon’s speech
also touched upon the hope of a close relationship with Afghanistan that ought
to be based on an overarching “Persianate” connection (Hodgson 1977: 46;
Fragner 1999) between the two states rather than on local affinity between
people on both banks of the Panj (who at specific points speak Tajik as a first
language, but predominantly live in multilingual settings in Gorno-Badakhshan)
(Example 4):
(4) In addition, Tajikistan has always paid special attention to deepening the
good, constructive, and reciprocal connections with its close neighbours
and their people, including friendly and brotherly Afghanistan, which
shares with us linguistic and cultural similarities.
(Prezident 2011)
In many of his speeches, Rahmon positions himself as the person responsible
for the “national”, for countrywide unity and alignment (Heathershaw 2009:
70), and in this particular case for broader links between Persian-speaking
Tajikistan and Afghanistan (and their Persian varieties Tajik and Dari). With
audiences of diverse (linguistic) backgrounds throughout the country, such an
approach can coincide with local needs and aspirations, but also has the
potential to provoke “friction” and a sense of disconnectedness among listen-
ers. Thus, when it comes to showing concern for those local needs and
aspirations that do not fit into the framework of a Tajik-centric state ideology,
other actors often enter the stage. In many localities in Ismaili-dominated
Gorno-Badakhshan, the man taking this place is the Aga Khan, who is not
only the current Imam of the Nizari-Ismaili Muslims, but also the chairman of
the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), which is largely responsible for
bridge construction across the Panj as well as for numerous other development
projects in the region.
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5 A princely flow of goods
Prince Shah Karim Al Hussaini Aga Khan IV entered different scenes in
Tajikistan at an early stage of the civil war in 1993. To people in Gorno-
Badakhshan, the Aga Khan is the man who saved them from starvation with
the help of humanitarian aid; to Ismailis in Tajikistan, he is not only an earthly
provider but also the spiritual leader; and to representatives of the government,
he seems like a double-edged sword, both a political-economic necessity
and potential ally of the Pamiri opposition-cum-religious other (Steinberg 2011:
129–130). It is against this backdrop that one can read the final words of
President Rahmon’s speech in Khorog (see Example 2). In his speech, the
president calls for patriotism and action against those who work against
national unity, the “outside forces and enemies of the nation and the state”
(nerūhoi beruna va badkhohoni millatu davlatamon), and he reminds his audi-
ence that it was actually he who “brought” the Aga Khan to Gorno-Badakhshan
for the first time in 1995 (Oghokhoni IV … ovarda budam) (Prezident 2012).
The act of having “brought” the Aga Khan to Gorno-Badakhshan served
President Rahmon as a tool to claim legitimacy in the region, and can be interpreted
as an attempt to signal both benevolence towards and control over his audience. Yet
to amajority of people in Gorno-Badakhshan it alsomakes it clear that the president
does not represent what the Aga Khan stands for as a “social, political and spiritual
leader” (Steinberg 2011: 10). As global connections in the region have quickly
moved away from a Soviet framework in the past twenty years, the president has
virtually “outsourced” concerns for the local to a man who resides in France and
addresses his Badakhshani audiences in English. This points to a differentiation of
scales whereby “national interests” are attributes of President Rahmon, but both
global and local matters are those of the Aga Khan. Accordingly, we can understand
how popular encounters with the Aga Khan, which occur in English and are
simultaneously translated into Tajik, are linked to rather different language ideol-
ogies than the ostensibly “monolingual” Tajik meetings with Rahmon.
On 31 October 2006, for instance, the Aga Khan, along with President
Rahmon and high-ranking officials from both Afghanistan and Tajikistan, parti-
cipated in the opening ceremony for the bridge in Ishkoshim at the southern tip
of Gorno-Badakhshan. His speech was thus situated in a multilingual setting,
both with regard to the speakers and the particular locality of Ishkoshim, where
Pamir languages and Tajik intersect in everyday encounters. In his speech,
which he delivered in English and which was simultaneously translated into
Tajik (and informally into Pamir languages by the guests), the Aga Khan referred
to bridge construction as an endeavour with both moral and economic
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dimensions. Depicting the tight intertwining of these dimensions, he introduced
his speech with the following words (Example 5):
(5) It has always seemed to me that bridges are among the most powerful and
important symbols in human society − symbols of connection, of coopera-
tion and of harmony. When harmony breaks down and conflicts ensue, the
destroying of bridges is usually among the most urgent targets. But when
peace and healing come, then it is the construction and rehabilitation of
bridges that marks our progress.
(AKDN 2006)
The Aga Khan’s metaphor of the bridge as a prime indicator of war and peace,
backwardness and progress, was as much a multi-layered reference to colonial
boundary-making and Soviet hegemony in the region as it was a subtle reference
to the Tajik civil war and the end of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In this
sense, the bridge stands for the materialized morality of an alternate economic-
political vision that draws on unimpeded mobility and a free flow of goods and
people (Example 6):
(6) Each of the bridges I have mentioned has had a considerable moral and
symbolic value, inspiring a spirit of confidence, progress and hope. But
these projects also have a very concrete economic value, allowing for a
substantial expansion of productive exchange. People in both countries
are granted unprecedented access to markets beyond their immediate
frontiers. Goods originating in Pakistan can now make their way to
Tajikistan. Products from China now have a fast road transit to
Afghanistan.
(AKDN 2006)
In this idealized version of capitalism, the emphasis on the local is key because
the economy is not just seen as involving depersonalized interactions between
strangers, but as building upon the convergence of neighbouring people. In his
speech in Ishkoshim, the Aga Khan emphasized this as follows (Example 7):
(7) Links and meeting places created by the bridges do more than simply
facilitate commerce. We exchange questions and answers. We trade in
products, but we can also trade in ideas. Communities on each side of
the border will know one another better and be better able to help one
another grow, prosper and share the lessons of life.
(AKDN 2006)
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In parts of his speech, the Aga Khan drew on the conceptual metaphor of “con-
versation is economy”. The goods in this metaphor were questions, answers, and
ideas. With his words in English, the Aga Khan thus enacted the very metaphor to
which he referred. While “trade in ideas” and “sharing” in non-material ways are
integral to the Aga Khan’s humanitarian philosophy, the expression of the wish to
go beyond national borders, not only economically but also spiritually, coincides
with the fact that in many places in Gorno-Badakhshan people on both sides of the
Panj are Ismailis. From an official perspective as conveyed by the Aga Khan, they
are therefore in need of unity and ideally part of a network of local Ismaili commu-
nities around the world (Steinberg 2011). Thus, building bridges across the Panj not
only serves the economic interconnectivity of Tajikistan and Afghanistan, of Central
and South Asia, but also the (re-)connection of people with shared religious
(Ismaili) and linguistic (Pamir languages/Tajik) identities who were separated in
the course of colonial and Cold War boundary-making.
The Aga Khan’s ideal of connectivity touches upon dimensions of globaliza-
tion that go beyond the mere commodification of human interaction and mobility.
He propagates the distinct vision of a reunion between the formerly disconnected
people of the Tajik-Afghan frontier. In many places in Gorno-Badakhshan this
envisaged reunion does not just involve the development of economic relations,
but is also linked to the fact that the Aga Khan considers the people on both banks
of the river to be part of his worldwide Nizari-Ismaili community (Jamat). From
such a perspective English serves, on the one hand, as the language of economic
globalization and development. On the other hand, to people in the region it is
also the language spoken by the Aga Khan as the current Imam of the Nizari-
Ismailis and as a social entrepreneur who stands for a humanitarian philosophy
with pluralism at its heart (Bolander 2016, this issue).
In the following section I will turn to ethnographic examples from my
fieldwork that show how President Rahmon’s and the Aga Khan’s visions and
practices reverberated among my interlocutors at the Tajik-Afghan frontier.
Drawing on data from participant observation and interviews, I will first show
how my interlocutors assessed the forms of “contact” that these visions and
practices entailed. I then seek to explore how my interlocutors positioned
themselves within subsequent processes of change and to analyse the conse-
quences this has for the notion of language as local practice.
6 Two tales of a river
Talking about the river Panj and the newly constructed pathways bridging it is
not an easy task in Gorno-Badakhshan. The river is an acknowledged conduit of
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opium and heroin trafficking from Afghanistan to Tajikistan (De Danieli 2011). In
addition, rumours circulate in the region that more money was spent on the
construction of the bridges than was necessary, and that some people got rich as
a result. This makes discussing the Panj a complex matter that is not only linked
to discourses of danger, but also to dangerous practices. Consequently, my
interlocutors in the region hardly ever focused on the river or the bridges, but
rather mentioned them in subordinate clauses and on the sidelines of our
conversations.
Thus it is not surprising that even Shahriyor, an elderly engineer who lives
in close proximity to the Panj and who is passionate about the construction of
infrastructure, did not talk much about the bridges when I met him in 2013. By
that time, Shahriyor had personally visited several of the bridges and was
aware of the speeches and visions that had come with their openings. In the
course of our conversation, which we held in Russian and Shughni, I asked
Shahriyor about his opinion on upcoming bridge projects. He replied as
follows (Example 8):
(8) Now I think they are finishing [the bridge] in Shurobod. And there are
bazaars. What does that tell us? It tells us about development. It tells us
that people trade among one another, that they eat and that they earn
money. If [the bridge] were to be closed, that would be very bad. In fact
these bridges are being built at the Aga Khan’s expenses. He is our Imam.
He is the Imam of the Ismailis. Tajikistan didn’t give a penny for the road
construction. The bridges were built at the Aga Khan’s expenses. … A lot of
schools were built, too. Hospitals were repaired at the Aga Khan’s
expenses. Our great Imam! He is our Imam.
As our conversation progressed Shahriyor repeatedly stressed that he considered
the newly established links to Afghanistan to be symbols of development
(razvitie), primarily because the Aga Khan had been involved in their construc-
tion. Tajikistan, represented by President Rahmon, had contributed nothing but
the permission to open the border. At the same time − and this was an important
argument throughout our discussion – Shahriyor insisted that the bridges
should have never been constructed and the border should have stayed closed.
In this regard, Shahriyor defined himself as coming from a “Communist family”,
with his father having been such a “serious Communist” that “if Lenin had told
him not to sleep with his wife, he would have not slept with her”. It is against
this backdrop that one can read Shahriyor’s reply to my question about how he
related to the people on the Afghan side after the opening of the bridges
(Example 9):
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(9) They didn’t do anything. … They’re just enjoying [the bridge]. … They are a
different nation. They are not like us … because there’s still socialism in
our system. In fact, we haven’t broken the [socialist] system yet. In fact, it’s
like we were going down a different road than they were, and the old
system remains.
Shahriyor’s distinction between a socialist “us” on the Tajik side of the river and
a rather undefined, vaguely backward “them” on the Afghan side of the Panj can
be seen as a result of the Soviet project of modernization in Gorno-Badakhshan.
In the course of this project the state attempted to integrate the border region
into a larger Soviet framework through the building of infrastructure, “Moscow
provisioning”, and mobility (Bliss 2006: 247–270). At the same time, this process
enforced the development of dichotomies such as socialist vs. capitalist, pro-
gressive vs. backwards, and civilized vs. barbaric along the Tajik-Afghan border
river. Manetta (2011), on the other hand, maintains that these dichotomies have
also led to a positive depiction of the Afghan side of the border region as
standing for the primitive, yet purer part of the Tajik side’s own past (see also
Remtilla 2012: 130–147).
To many of my interlocutors at the Tajik-Afghan frontier, the fact that they
shared linguistic and religious identities with those on the other side of the Panj
mattered little in their everyday lives. Except for infrequent encounters with
Afghans in the context of cross-border markets (Amidkhonov 2013; Maertens
2014), “contact” with them was mostly mediated by the Aga Khan’s speeches
and “edicts” (farmon), as well as by projects of AKDN institutions. In fact, my
interlocutors in Khorog stated that they were more likely to encounter Afghan
citizens from other parts of Afghanistan than those from just across the river.
Hence, Shahriyor’s reference to socialism as “in our system” is not only an
indicator of nostalgia for the past commonly reflected in post-socialist theory
(Nadkarni and Shevchenko 2004; Todorova and Gille 2010). It also refers to at
least three different scales: despite underscoring his identity as an Ismaili,
Shahriyor framed his argument of a Tajik “us” and an Afghan “them” in con-
nection with a national scale and projects of Tajik nation-building. At the same
time his reference to “intrinsic” socialism is also a description of current con-
nectivity and spatial organization in Gorno-Badakhshan, which as a region still
relies on Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication and is econom-
ically highly dependent on labour migration to other parts of the former Soviet
Union (Khuseynova 2013: 32).
My interlocutors linked Afghanistan to general anxiety and perceived the
opening of the border as a potential threat to Gorno-Badakhshan. They did so in
contrast to the differing visions of globalization conveyed by President Rahmon
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and the Aga Khan, drawing on the distinction between a modern “us” and a pre-
modern “them”. Together with the common Soviet past, the experience of
modernization, and knowledge of Russian, delimitation from hostile
Afghanistan was among the most frequently mentioned traits of a Gorno-
Badakhshani identity that spanned ethnicity, language, and religion.
In this regard even in Murghab, a predominantly Kyrgyz-speaking Sunni
town located some 300 kilometres east of Khorog on the far eastern edge of
Gorno-Badakhshan, bridge construction across the Panj was a hotly debated
topic in the course of my fieldwork. For instance, during an interview on family
networks in 2013 with Bakytgül, a female healer in Murghab, she mentioned
Afghanistan as a place of ancestral Kyrgyz kin relations. However, she also
emphasized that these links had ceased to exist in the course of early Soviet
rule. Baktygül assessed the reconnection between Tajikistan and Afghanistan
and the construction of the bridges as negative and misguided initiatives. In the
course of our conversation in Kyrgyz she said (Example 10):
(10) Many bridges are built here leading to Afghanistan. [The Aga Khan] helped
because he thought people there would live in peace. But they don’t live in
peace. There are mujaheddin over there. They want war and continue to
come again and again.
During the interview, Baktygül emphasized her appreciation for the Aga Khan,
whose institutions had secured livelihoods in Murghab during the civil war
despite the fact that only a minority of the town’s inhabitants are Ismaili. At
the same time, she considered the opening of the border with Afghanistan a
naïve and ill-informed act. In her view, Afghanistan was a dangerous place that
should be kept at distance, a condition Soviet border guards had attempted to
preserve until 1991.5
In the course of our conversations, both Shahriyor and Baktygül frequently
referred to the Soviet past, and socialism in particular, as points of reference that
unite the people of Gorno-Badakhshan and make them distinct from those on
the Afghan side of the Panj. Shahriyor’s and Baktygül’s use of certain terminol-
ogy is tied to their age − both are over fifty − and therefore to the fact that they
personally experienced and remember life in the Soviet Union. However, many
of my younger interlocutors described similar forms of connectedness based on
their years-long experiences as labour migrants in Russia. These experiences,
5 The Soviet border guards were followed by Russian troops who protected the border along the
Panj until 2005. In Baktygül’s opinion, these Russian border guards should again return and
replace the allegedly corrupt and incompetent Tajik border guards.
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often also linked to being treated as second-class migrants, had left them with
ambivalent attitudes towards Russia as a state, but also with a strong feeling of
intimacy towards the Russian language and culture. A sense of disconnected-
ness from the Afghan side of the Panj is therefore not simply a historical
phenomenon that will dissolve in the course of post-Cold War globalization, as
envisaged by President Rahmon and the Aga Khan. The re-emphasis on the
boundary is also a contemporary process and one of the outcomes of a particular
transregional connection between Gorno-Badakhshan and Russia.
7 Language and locality beyond bridges
Existing studies on language at the Tajik-Afghan frontier (e.g., Wurm 1996; Bliss
2006: 90–103; Beck 2013) tend to map different languages onto specific geogra-
phical spaces. In many ways, such an approach walks in the footsteps of Soviet
attempts to attribute languages and, as a result, ethnicity, to particular repub-
lics, regions, and districts (Smith 1998: 1–13). Pennycook (2010: 130) argues that
the definition of locality as a “mappable construct” allows for the recognition of
glossodiversity, or the multiplicity of languages. However, he also maintains that
such an approach does not pay sufficient attention to the semiodiversity, or the
multiplicity of meanings within a language.
The importance of Pennycook’s statement for an understanding of current
processes at the Tajik-Afghan frontier becomes, for instance, visible in the
course of presidential visits to the region. Speaking to different audiences,
President Rahmon measures different degrees of loyalty in terms of alignment
with his policies and the state, which is defined through Tajik language and
culture. However, this does not mean that people in Gorno-Badakhshan simply
project their agreement or disagreement onto Tajik as a positive or negative
language of state ideology. In contrast, Tajik, and with it its words and sounds,
evokes a multiplicity of meanings that include its role as a language of religion
and ritual, a language of poetry, a language of historical significance indicative
of a past and present Persianate connection, and sometimes also a language of
current political opportunity and oppression.
In a similar vein, the Aga Khan’s encounters and his use of English at the
Tajik-Afghan frontier are far from being single-layered. In this regard, the
English language’s role as indexing “economic globalization” (Heller 2010)
and “international development” (Pennycook 1994) is only the most obvious
part of the story. In addition, English is also seen as the language of the Aga
Khan, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, whose words have a deeply
esoteric meaning (Bolander 2016). However, English also indexes “foreign
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intervention” at a former Cold War boundary and plays a mediating role in the
supposed reunion of speakers of local languages.
Yet it remains unclear what these “local languages” even are. In competing
ascriptions of meaning, they are mapped onto the Tajik-Afghan frontier as a
cluster of micro-regions that were separated in the course of Cold War bound-
ary-making. At the same time, both historically established and new forms of
mobility from Gorno-Badakhshan and back challenge such ascriptions (see also
Bolander, this issue). For instance, encounters between Shughni rappers, who
produce their music in Moscow and have their audiences in Gorno-Badakhshan,6
can only be called “local” if we understand “locality” as going far beyond context
(Pennycook 2010: 128). Similarly, close historical and present-day ties to Russian
have shaped the multiple meanings of languages in Gorno-Badakhshan as integral
parts of the region and of a world beyond. In this regard, Russian refers to positive
and negative aspects of Soviet history, border security, the sufferings of labour
migrants, and literacy. At the same time, Russian also halts at the Panj and thus
symbolizes a specific form of connectedness that is defined through the absence
and exclusion of the Afghan side of the river.
8 Conclusion
In this article I conceptualize the Tajik-Afghan frontier in Tajikistan’s Gorno-
Badakhshan region as a “contact zone” in which different actors engage in
communicative encounters. I take the construction of bridges across the Panj as
an example and point of departure to analyse how these actors envisage processes
of development and globalization, and to discuss the roles that language ideolo-
gies play in the course of such encounters. In this regard I maintain that, follow-
ing Pennycook (2010), a focus on language as local practice does not only offer a
take on the Tajik-Afghan frontier as marked by a high degree of different lan-
guages, but by multiple meanings within and beyond these languages. As a result
I argue that highlighting the locality of languages at the Tajik-Afghan frontier
provides us with the opportunity to explore them as tied to specific communica-
tive encounters in semiotized time and space. Consequently, the standard percep-
tion of languages as distinct and stable entities takes a backseat. In a similar vein,
I argue that the terms that we use to describe specific languages are polysemic
and rarely refer to one “thing”. I suggest that this point not only has implications
for the study of the Tajik-Afghan frontier, but also for a broader scholarship of
6 A prominent example is the Moscow-based Pamiri rapper Dorob-YAN’s, who has become
widely popular in Gorno-Badakhshan in recent years.
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Central Asia in which, for instance, specific linguistic identities often serve as an
entry point to explore ethnicity.
I maintain that languages at the Tajik-Afghan frontier are local, yet not isolated
practices. They variously intersect with other local practices that can be roughly
defined as political, religious, economic, and so forth. I argue that different forms of
global connections come into the picture precisely in the course of suchmoments of
intersection within communicative encounters. The “friction” (Tsing 2005: 5) that
occurs during communication across difference and in moments of diversely inter-
secting and sometimes contradictory practices fuels the emergence of multiple
meanings, not only with regard to language, but to a range of practices. Actors at
the Tajik-Afghan frontier are thus eager to (re-)connect to South Asia, yet hesitant to
open the border. They are loyal citizens of Tajikistan, yet unwilling to speak the
president’s language. They love Russian literature, but hate having to work as
migrant labourers in Moscow. And they consider the Aga Khan’s English words
wise, but firmly stick to “their” bank of the river.
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